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Abstract
Philosophers of science increasingly believe that much of science is concerned with
understanding the mechanisms responsible for the production of natural phenomena. An
adequate understanding of scientific research requires an account of how scientists
develop and test models of mechanisms. This paper offers a general account of the nature
of mechanical models, discussing the representational relationship that holds between
mechanisms and their models as well as the techniques that can be used to test and refine
such models. The analysis is supported by study of two competing models of a
mechanism of speech perception.
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The past several years have seen the growth of a mechanisms movement in the
philosophy of biology and in the philosophy of science more generally. Mechanist
philosophers of biology believe that mechanisms are the key to understanding biological
phenomena. Perhaps because of the realist tendencies of the philosophers involved, most
of the literature has focused on the properties of mechanisms themselves and has not said
much about the relationships between mechanisms and their models or theoretical
representations. My goal in this paper is to redress this deficiency and to sketch an
account of the relationship between mechanisms and our models of them. I will describe
a particular kind of model, called a , and will discuss the relationship between this sort of
model and other models that have been discussed in the philosophical literature. I will
then offer a detailed case study of two competing models of a phenomenon in the field of
speech perception. This case study will illustrate several important issues regarding
mechanical models. It will give substance to the claim that models are related to
mechanisms via similarity relations; it will demonstrate how it is possible to make
inferences about mechanisms when one cannot directly study the properties of the
mechanism’s parts; and it will illustrate the connection between mechanistic inference
and the problem of underdetermination.

I.

Mechanisms and Mechanical Models

There is a large literature devoted to the nature of biological models and the
strategy of model building in biology (e.g., Levins, 1968; Lewontin, 1974; Wimsatt,
1987), but such discussions generally have proceeded without any detailed analysis of
what models are. To the extent that there is an accepted “theory of models,” philosophers
of biology (e.g., Beatty, 1981; Lloyd, 1994) have adopted the view of models developed
by advocates of the semantic view of theories (see Suppe, 1974; 1989)
Most advocates of the semantic view of theories characterize models in terms of
state spaces. 1 According to the state space approach, the state of a physical system can be
characterized by a set of state variables—variables measuring the values of various
physical magnitudes. The set of logically possible states of the system can be identified
with the set of all possible combinations of values of each of the variables, and these
combinations in turn are treated as vectors in the state space. The dynamical behavior of
a modeled system can be characterized in terms of the trajectory of the system through
this vector space over time. Physically possible changes in the state of a system may be
characterized by laws of succession, while physically possible combinations of values of
state variables can be characterized by laws of coexistence (Suppe, 1989).
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Others (e.g., Suppes, 1960) characterize models as set-theoretic structures, but this
approach has not received much discussion among philosophers of biology.
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The state space representation is powerful and flexible, and it is hard to imagine
anything that scientists might call a model that could not be represented in this way.
Indeed, this type of representational format is borrowed from physics, and has been used
in biology as well (Lewontin, 1974). But while state space models provide a convenient
formalism, this characterization is too abstract to give much insight into the nature of the
relationship between a model and the system modeled or into the strategies of model
building, testing and revision.
Bill Wimsatt has claimed that “[a]t least in biology, most scientists see their work
as explaining types of phenomena by discovering mechanisms . . .’ (Wimsatt, 1972, p.
67). If Wimsatt is right about this, it seems plausible that most of the models developed
by biologists will be models of mechanisms. 2 Accordingly, we can develop a deeper
understanding of the nature of modeling in biology by developing a theory of mechanical
models.
A mechanical model is (not surprisingly) a model of a mechanism, so to present
an account of mechanical models, a first step is to offer some analysis of the concept of
mechanism. In an earlier paper (Glennan, 2002) I have offered the following definition of
a mechanism:
(M) A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by
the interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be
characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations. 3
While I shall not defend this definition here, a few clarifications are in order. In the first
place, mechanisms underlie behaviors. The behavior that the mechanism underlies, or,
more simply, the behavior of the mechanism, is what the mechanism does. A heart is a
mechanism for pumping blood, a Coke machine is a mechanism for dispensing Cokes in
return for coins, and so on. Craver and Darden (2001) emphasize the same point about
mechanisms, referring to what the mechanism does as the “phenomenon” that the
mechanism produces.
Mechanisms can have behaviors of a variety of forms. Perhaps the most familiar
are mechanisms that respond to inputs with outputs (e.g, Coke machines or neurons), but
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This claim I would argue is true of many domains beside biology. It should be true of
any domain where explanations or predictions are sought by examining the organization
and interaction of parts of complex systems – including much of physics and chemistry,
psychology, and economics.
3
This definition reflects a slight modification from a definition I proposed earlier
(Glennan, 1996). I have replaced an appeal to laws with the more specific notion of a
“direct, invariant, change relating generalization. This analysis of mechanism is
substantially in agreement with a number of other analyses, including those of Bechtel
and Richardson (1993) and Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000).
3

there are also, for instance, mechanisms that maintain systems in stable states or
mechanisms that produce a periodic behavior (e.g., the mechanism that explains Old
Faithful’s eruptions. Many mechanisms are, like hearts and Coke machines, designed to
behave as they do, but one can equally well talk about mechanisms underlying behaviors
that, like the eruptions of Old Faithful, are not the product of design.
The second part of the definition that requires explanation is the notion of ‘direct,
invariant, change-relating generalizations.’ These generalizations characterize the causal
interactions between parts of mechanisms. They function as laws in Mitchell’s (1997)
pragmatic sense, though, unlike laws on the positivist conception, they depend in
essential ways on particulars, are subject to breakdowns, and are not of unrestricted
scope. The term ‘change-relating generalization’ is borrowed from Woodward (2000), to
indicate a generalization that characterizes how a change in the property of one or more
parts brings about a change in the property of another part. It is meant to exclude
generalizations that hold true in virtue of common causes, global constraints,
conservation principles, and the like. If models were represented in terms of laws
describing transitions in a state space, these laws would be the laws of succession. The
most typical form for this kind of generalization would be a differential equation, though
many change relating generalizations might describe discrete changes. The stipulation
that the generalizations be direct is meant to rule out generalizations that describe more
remote effects. For instance, depressing the button on the Coke machine causes a Coke to
be dispensed, but only via the complex interaction of a number of parts. Hence, there is
no direct generalization connecting button presses to the dispensing of Cokes.
An important feature of this conception of mechanism is that it is hierarchical (cf.
Glennan 1996; Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000; Craver, 2002). The parts of
mechanisms may themselves be mechanisms, and the change-relating generalizations
connecting those parts may themselves be mechanical processes. The behavior of the
mechanism can often be described by a change-relating generalization. We might
describe the behavior of a simple Coke machine in the following change-relating
generalization: “Whenever $1 is inserted and the button marked ‘Coke’ is pressed, a Coke
appears in the slot at the bottom of the machine.” The fact that the statement is true is
explained by facts about how the Coke machine works. Generalizations of this kind I call
mechanically explicable (cf. Glennan 1996; 1997). As a less homely example, Mendel’s
first law, which we might state as “Whenever a parent is heterozygous at a locus, the
proportion of gametes produced by the parent carrying each allele will be .5,” is also
mechanically explicable. It follows from facts about the mechanisms used in organisms
to produce gametes.
There is thus a two-way relationship between invariant generalizations and
mechanisms. First, reliable behavior of mechanisms depends upon the existence of
invariant relations between their parts, and change-relating generalizations characterize
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these relations. Second, many such generalizations are mechanically explicable, in the
sense that they are just generalizations about the behavior of mechanisms. A single
generalization can both be explained by a mechanism and characterize the interaction
between parts of a larger mechanism. For instance, Mendel’s first law is explained by the
standard mechanisms of gamete formation, while evenly segregated gametes, produced in
accordance with Mendel’s first law, play a part in larger mechanisms, for instance the
mechanism by which deleterious alleles will be (generally) driven to extinction.
Given this understanding of what a mechanism is, we now can define a
mechanical model:
(MM) A mechanical model consists of (i) a description of the mechanism’s behavior (the
behavioral description); and (ii) a description of the mechanism that accounts for
that behavior (the mechanical description).
The two-part characterization of a mechanism, in terms of a behavior and the mechanism
that produces it, leads naturally to a two-part characterization of a mechanical model. The
behavioral description is a description of the overall behavior of a mechanism. The
mechanical description is a description of the mechanism’s parts and their functional
arrangement. Another way to put it is to say that the behavior description tells one what a
mechanism is doing, while the mechanical description tells one how the mechanism does
it. 4
The sense in which the two parts of a mechanical model are descriptions requires
clarification. They are not descriptions in the sense of ‘descriptive phrases’ familiar from
Russell’s theory of descriptions, nor indeed can they be identified as sets of sentences or
as syntactically defined entities of any kind. Rather, they are semantic entities, in the
sense that there can exist many syntactically different formulations of the same
description. For instance, the behavioral description of an ecological model where a
population oscillates around a carrying capacity could be presented either
diagrammatically or by means of differential equations while still counting as the same
description. For one to have different behavioral descriptions, the behavior described
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This way of expressing the relationship suggests a close affinity between this
distinction and Marr’s (1982) distinction between computational and algorithmic
theories.
A number of readers have suggested that the behavioral description should not be
part of the mechanical model. I have adopted the two-part approach principally to
emphasize that the behavioral description is itself a model that is only similar to the
modeled behavior in certain degrees and respects. In evaluating a model one must
evaluate the adequacy of both the mechanical description and the behavioral description.
One might alternately take the view that these descriptions are separate models, with the
behavioral description being a “model of data” in Suppes’ (1962) sense.
5

must be different. Thus, if in one model the oscillation of the population dampens while
in another it does not, we have different behavioral descriptions, and hence different
models.
One way to look at the relationship between the behavioral and mechanical
descriptions is as a distinction between a description of the external behavior of a
mechanism and a description of its internal workings, but sometimes the spatial
terminology must be construed metaphorically. In their discussion of strategies for
discerning mechanical structure, Bechtel and Richardson (1993) have usefully
distinguished between decomposition and localization. Localization is a spatial notion –
where one identifies parts of mechanisms via their locations – while decomposition
identifies parts of mechanisms by their functional relations. When functions are spatially
localizable, decomposition and localization will yield the same analysis, and as Bechtel
and Richardson emphasize, localization can provide a powerful heuristic for the
discovery of functional decompositions. Functional localization can fail, however, when
the parts responsible for particular functions are distributed in space or are not stable in
location over time. It should be clear, given that (M) defines mechanisms in terms of
functional relations between parts, that in such cases it is the functional structure revealed
by decomposition that is constitutive of mechanism.
The most important difference between mechanical models and state-space
models is that mechanical models have two parts. According to the state-space
conception, the possible states of the system modeled are represented by the set of vectors
in a state space, and a particular model can be understood as a curve through this space.
As a very simple example, consider how we might construct a state-space model of an
analog watch. The state of the watch at a given time can be characterized by two
variables, one representing the position of the hour hand and the other the position of the
minute hand. One can then plot the evolution of the state of the watch through time as a
periodic curve in this space. From the mechanistic point of view, this description of the
watch is only half a model of the watch. It is, in particular, a description of the behavior
of the watch. What is lacking is a description of the mechanism that produces this
behavior. A mechanical description would characterize how the various parts of the
watch (the battery, the quartz crystal, the hands, the internal gears, etc.) cause the hands to
move in the way characterized by the behavioral description.
The internal workings of the mechanism can be represented using the state space
approach as well. The relevant properties of the interacting parts of the mechanism could
be coded as state variables. Laws of succession could be specified that express how
changes in values of state variables representing properties of one part bring about
changes in the values of state variables representing properties of directly linked parts. In
this case, the laws of succession are the change-relating generalizations referred to in (M).
What this example shows is that the notion of a mechanical model is more restricted than
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that of a state-space model. Whether a state space model is a mechanical model depends
upon what state variables are chosen, and whether the laws of succession used to
characterize the state changes represent direct causal interactions between the parts of the
mechanism.
It is possible to formulate a mechanical model using a state space representation
but that not all state space models are mechanical models. The requirements for a model
being a description of a mechanism place substantive constraints on the choice of state
variables (such as the fact that state variables should refer to properties of parts),
parameters, and laws of succession and coexistence. The satisfaction of these additional
constraints is what accounts for the explanatory power of mechanical models. The
division between the behavioral description and the mechanical description is analogous
to the division between explanandum and explanans. The mechanism characterized by
the mechanical description brings about, and hence explains, the behavior characterized
by the behavioral description. 5 If the behavioral description is a statement of a law (in
the weak sense described above), then that law is mechanically explicable.
Two further points should be made which will have significant implications for
the subsequent discussion of testing mechanical models. First, notice that the concept of
a mechanism’s behavior generally presupposes a concept of normal functioning. When
one describes the behavior of a mechanism, one describes how it will behave if it is not
broken. For instance, in describing the behavior of the watch in terms of the periodic
rotation of hands, one presupposes that the watch’s battery has not worn out and many
other things of that sort. The “if it not broken” clause is a kind of ceteris paribus clause
for behavioral descriptions. This idea of “normal function” is required even for
mechanisms that are not the product of design or selection. If, for instance, one describes
the behavior of the El Ninõ mechanism, the description presupposes that the normal
mechanism by which El Ninõ produces its effects is not disrupted by exogenous factors
(like the earth being hit by a large asteroid).
The second point is that there is a one-many relationship between behavioral and
mechanical descriptions. This is because the same behavior can be produced by different
mechanisms. A spring wound watch and a Quartz crystal watch will (relative to most
descriptions) behave the same way, even though the mechanism that produces the
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The division is only analogous. I am adopting an ontic conception of explanation in
which the locus of explanatory insight is “in the objects.” It is the fact that the
mechanism brings about the behavior, not that the mechanical description entails the
behavioral description, which yields the explanation (cf. Glennan, 2002). At the same
time, we can only achieve understanding of a phenomena with the help of an adequate
representation of the phenomena and of the mechanism that brings it about.
7

behavior will be quite different. We shall take up the question of how to choose between
competing models of the same behavior in the last section of this paper.
One of the most controversial questions in the recent literature on modeling
concerns the relationship between models and the real systems they model. At least since
Levins (1968) it has been widely recognized that the models scientists use are generally
false, in the sense that they are based on clearly false idealizing assumptions. My view is
that the key to understanding how false models can be genuinely explanatory is to realize
that even a false model can provide a partial representation of a modeled system. I follow
Ron Giere (1988) in claiming that the representation relation exists in virtue of
similarities in various degrees and respects between the model and the modeled system.
Giere (1999) has usefully compared models to maps. The most salient feature of this
analogy is that maps, like models, represent only certain aspects of the region that is
mapped. Hence, there can be different maps of the same terrain, with each map bearing
similarity relations to the terrain only in certain degrees and respects. 6
Let me conclude with a point regarding terminology. The notion of a mechanical
model that I have developed is closely related to what Machamer, Darden and Craver
(2000) have called a ‘mechanism schema.’ While I concur with much of what they say
regarding mechanism schemata, I prefer the term ‘mechanical model’ for several reasons.
Most importantly, scientists often use the term ‘model’ to refer to thing entities I call
mechanical models. Also, Machamer, Darden and Craver introduce the term ‘mechanism
schema’ in part in contrast to what they call a ‘mechanism sketch.’ Their idea is that a
mechanism sketch is an incomplete schema – one in which the component entities and
activities have not been completely identified. Sketches are filled in to provide schemata,
and schemata are what are required for mechanistic explanation. The problem with the
sketch/schema distinction is that it makes into a two-step process what is in reality a
process of continuous model articulation.

II.

Models of Vowel Normalization

In this section I shall apply the analysis of mechanical models to two models from
the cognitive psychology literature on speech perception. These models seek to explain
the auditory processing mechanisms by which listeners adjust to variations in the
acoustical properties of different talkers’ vowel sounds. The process of adjusting to this
variation is called vowel normalization. Because this case is not well known to
philosophers, I will begin with some background on the basics of speech perception. I
will then describe the models, demonstrating how they both satisfy the characterization of
6

There is a voluminous literature on idealization in modeling and the nature of
representation. See, e.g., Wimsatt (1987), Morgan and Morrison (1999), Bailer-Jones
(2003) and Odenbaugh (under review).
8

a mechanical model given in the previous section. In the concluding section of the paper
I will discuss experimental work that has been done to evaluate these models, showing
how this case supports the view that models represent mechanisms only in degrees and
respects.
While many of the points about representation and testing could have been made
using a variety of examples, I have chosen this case for two reasons. First, unlike most
paradigm cases in the literature, the parts of these putative mechanisms are, at least at this
point, difficult to localize. I want to show how it is possible to construct and test a
mechanical model even in such cases. Second, and relatedly, this case illustrates how it is
possible to evaluate competing models of the same phenomena even when one can’t
directly identify and manipulate the parts of the mechanism responsible. I will argue that
these methods, which I call methods of indirect testing, provide us with some grip on a
methodologically interesting version of the underdetermination problem.
Researchers in speech perception seek to understand the mechanisms by which
listeners transform acoustic signals into sequences of phonemes. 7 Acoustically speaking,
a speech signal is just a sound wave. One way to characterize a speech signal is with an
oscillogram, which is a plot of the wave’s amplitude over time. An alternative way to
characterize a wave is with a continuous spectogram. In a continuous spectogram, the
sound wave is decomposed into frequency components that are analyzed continuously
from short snippets of the speech signal. The result is a three-dimensional plot
representing intensity (wave amplitude) at each frequency over time. The majority of
acoustical information required for vowel phonological recognition is coded by the wave
spectrum, and in particular by peaks (local maxima) of intensity in the spectrum called
formants.
Normal (i.e., non-whispered) vowels and other voiced speech sounds are produced
by passing vibrating air from the vocal cords, which function as a forced harmonic
oscillator, through the articulatory tract (chiefly the mouth and nose), which functions as
resonator. By altering physiological features of the articulatory tract (the openness of the
mouth, the position of the tongue, etc.), a talker can change the resonant frequencies of
the tract.
The configuration of the articulatory tract at any given time can be characterized
by a frequency response curve. The local maxima in this curve (i.e., the frequencies at
which the resonator resonates) are the formants. Physiologically, formant positions are
determined chiefly by the shape of the mouth and lips and the position of the tongue.
Formants are numbered from lowest to highest (F1, F2, etc.) according to the frequency
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For further background on the production and perception of speech, the reader may wish
to consult (Moore, 2003).
9

of their peak resonance. The frequency of the formants (especially F1, F2 and F3) turns
out to be a major determinant in the perception of different phonemes. Besides formant
frequencies, the fundamental frequency of the wave (which is the frequency of oscillation
of the vocal cords), called F0, also influences phoneme perception.
The vowel perception models I shall discuss are concerned with explaining the
ability of American English speaking listeners to identify English language vowels.
Table 1 lists the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) symbols for the ten English
vowels studied in these models:
IPA Symbol Sample Word
i

heed

I

hid

Ε

head

Θ

had

℘
a

hud
hod
hawed

Υ
u

hood

ə⇓

heard

who’d

Table 1: IPA Symbols for American English Vowels 8
The most significant pieces of information used by listeners to recognize vowel
sounds are the frequencies of the first and second formants. Most listeners accurately
recognize artificial vowels that are constructed by masking all but F1 and F2 cues from
naturally produced vowels. Differences in F1 and F2 intensities also correspond fairly
closely to different places of articulation of vowels in the articulatory tract. Front vowels
(i.e., vowels where the tongue is positioned in the front of the mouth) like /i/ have
relatively higher F2 frequencies than back vowels like /u/. Low vowels (i.e., vowels
where the tongue is positioned low in the mouth) like /æ/ have relatively higher F1
frequencies than high vowels like /i/. Using F1 and F2 frequencies it is possible to
construct for a map of the speaker's vowel space. An F1/F2 map for an average talker is
pictured in figure 1:
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For more on phonetic vowels, including information on the articulatory features that
produce them, the reader may wish to consult the website of the International Phonetic
Association (http://www2.arts.gla.ac.uk/IPA/ipa.html).
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/i/

10

Scaled F2 Frequency

8

/I/

/E/
/Q/

6

/« ß
/
/Ã/
2

/U/
/u/

/a/
/�/

0
0

2

4

6

8

10

Scaled F1 Frequency
Figure 1: An Average Talker's Vowel Space 9
The difficulty with this simple characterization of vowel perception is that it does not take
into account variations in the vowel spaces across different talkers. Because different
talkers' F1 vs. F2 maps are different, signals that are similar with respect to F1 and F2
frequencies can represent different vowels in different talkers. The process by which
listeners adjust to different talkers’ vowel spaces is called vowel normalization.
In the remainder of this section, I describe two competing models of vowel
normalization, one proposed by L. J. Gerstman (1968) and the other proposed by A. K.
Syrdal and H. S. Gopal (1986). 10 While my primary concern will be with vowel
9

This graph is produced from average F1 and F2 frequencies collected by Peterson and
Barney (1952) and scaled to values between 0 and 10 by Gerstman (1968). This graph is
identical to one that appears in Gerstman 1968 except that I have replaced Gerstman's
notation for vowels with standard IPA symbols.
10
Unlike Syrdal and Gopal, Gerstman’s primary concern was to develop models for
machine recognition of human vowels, but the sort of information appealed to by
Gerstman is likely involved in human perception. In this paper we shall, following
Nusbaum and Morin (1992), consider Gerstman’s approach as a model for human vowel
recognition.
11

normalization itself, it is not possible to examine this component of the auditory system
in isolation. To evaluate different models of vowel normalization, one must first integrate
them into models of the larger recognition process. Models of normalization can be
compared indirectly by comparing models of vowel recognition that incorporate different
models of normalization. The two models that I will describe are thus not models of
vowel normalization alone, but models of the vowel recognition mechanism that
incorporate a normalization component.
These models are competing because they represent alternative hypotheses about
what mechanism underlies a particular behavior. The two models have a common
behavioral description, but differ in their mechanical description. To describe, and
ultimately evaluate, these models, we must first examine this common behavioral
description.
In the broadest sense, the behavior of a vowel recognition mechanism can be
described by a function from acoustic signals to vowel tokens. The acoustic signals of
interest are segments of human-produced speech that contain vowels. The study of
human vowel recognition is complicated considerably by two problems. In the first place,
acoustic properties of vowels can be altered by the phonetic context (i.e., what consonants
surround the vowel). Second, human subjects will use features of the lexical, semantic
and pragmatic context to provide additional information to aid in vowel recognition. In
order to isolate the acoustic features used in vowel recognition, the authors focused on the
analysis of a limited data set produced originally by Peterson and Barney (1952).
Peterson and Barney recorded vowels produced by 76 talkers (a mixture of men, women
and children). Each talker read from a randomly ordered list containing two repetitions of
the ten words listed in table 1. Peterson and Barney then made spectrographic
measurements of each vowel, measuring values of F0, F1, F2 and F3. Finally, they tested
the intelligibility of these vowels by playing them to twenty-six listeners. 1199 of the
1520 were unanimously recognized.
With respect to this data set, human listeners display good but not complete
accuracy in recognizing vowels. This level of performance with respect to the Peterson
and Barney data set serves as the (partial) behavioral description of the "average" human
vowel normalization mechanism. A model of vowel normalization should identify
vowels with approximately the same degree of accuracy as human listeners do. Both the
Gerstman and Syrdal/Gopal models satisfy this requirement. The two models therefore
have roughly the same behavioral description, but they offer different accounts of the
mechanism responsible for this behavior.
A.

The Gerstman Model

The basic idea behind the Gerstman model is that as a talker begins to speak the
listener’s auditory system acquires information about the F1 vs. F2 position of a small
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number of vowels, called point vowels, which are used calibrate (or “tune”) the
recognition mechanism to that talker's particular vowel space. The model suggested by
Gerstman is composed of four parts, which I shall call the formant frequency analyzer,
the calibration mechanism, the normalization mechanism and the identification
mechanism. The frequency analyzer is the part of the system that analyses a signal into a
frequency spectrum and identifies formants. The calibration mechanism analyzes a
calibration signal consisting of an initial segment of a particular talker’s speech in order
to determine the dimensions of that speaker's vowel space. The normalization
mechanism transforms absolute formant frequencies F1 and F2 into frequencies F1' and
F2' that are normalized to eliminate variations between different speakers' F1 vs. F2
spaces. The identification mechanism uses F1' and F2' to identify the vowel token. The
structure of the overall mechanism is indicated in figure 2:
Signal

Formant Frequency
Analyser
Calibrating Signal
(speech with point vowels)
F1,F2 (khz)

Calibration
M echanism

Vowel Space
Dimensions

Normalization
M echanism
F1',F2'
(normalized)

Identification
M echanism

Vowel Token

Figure 2: The Gerstman Vowel Normalization Model
The distinguishing feature of the Gerstman model is that the normalization mechanism
requires certain parameters that are not determined by the vowel signal being processed.
It is what Nusbaum and Morin (1992) call a “contextual tuning” mechanism. What is
needed to tune the mechanism are signals that provide the minimum and maximum
values of F1 and F2 for a given speaker’s vowels. These are given by the point vowels
(which are the leftmost, rightmost, topmost and bottommost vowels shown in figure 1).
Using the F1 and F2 values for these vowels (the vowel space dimensions), the
normalization mechanism can produce a normalized value of F1 and F2 for subsequent
13

vowel tokens. The identification mechanism works by comparing the position of the
normalized vowel (F1’, F2’) in the scaled vowel space (see figure 1) with the position of
average vowels within that space.
A mechanical model is more than just a set of generalizations about the external
behavior of a system; a model purports to describe the structure of the mechanism that
accounts for the behavior. Because the Gerstman model correctly classifies those vowel
tokens which are unanimously categorized by human listeners, it passes the first test of
accounting for the behavior of the system, at least insofar as identifying vowels in the
Peterson and Barney data set with accuracy comparable to humans counts as predicting
the behavior of the actual auditory mechanism. But beyond this, what claims has
Gerstman made about the internal structure of the auditory mechanism?
Figure 2 summarizes the claims about the structure of the mechanism.
Acceptance of the model involves commitment to the view that there are four distinct
components of the auditory mechanism that exhibit the behaviors described in the above
paragraphs. The internal structure of these components has been left largely unspecified.
For instance, the calibration mechanism must in some way acquire F1 and F2 frequencies
for point vowels, but Gerstman has not specified how these vowels are identified. They
would have to be identified by a mechanism that either normalizes vowels in a different
way or does not normalize at all. There are a number of ways in which the calibration
mechanism might work: it might rely on other features of the vowel token besides F1 and
F2 to identify unnormalized vowels; alternatively, it might rely on lexical or pragmatic
information. One might for instance suppose that a listener might rely on the fact talkers
say fairly standard things when they first begin speaking ("Hello!” etc.) and use this
information to help disambiguate any vowels that are initially ambiguous. A major
consideration in evaluating the Gerstman model is whether or not one can give plausible
accounts of how this and the other parts of the mechanism hypothesized by that model
might work.
B.

The Syrdal/Gopal Model

Syrdal and Gopal (1986) have developed a model of vowel recognition that uses a
different normalization model. Unlike the Gerstman model, the Syrdal/Gopal model
suggests that each vowel is self-normalizing. In other words, the model suggests that the
F1 and F2 values of each vowel token can be normalized by using other parts of the
acoustic signal and do not need tuning parameters extracted from the context of the
utterance. Syrdal and Gopal's model is represented schematically in figure 3:
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Signal

Formant Frequency
Analyser

F0,F1,F2,F3 (Bark)

Bark Difference
Analyser
Critical Bark
Differences

Critical Bark
Difference Analyser
Other Features
Specific Bark Difference

Vowel Identification
M echanism

Hi/Low
Front/Back

Feature Identification
M echanism

Vowel

Figure 3: The Syrdal/Gopal Vowel Normalization Model
Processing of each vowel, according to this model, occurs in five stages. First, the
acoustic signal is analyzed into formant pitches measured using a scale called the Bark
scale. 11 Second, differences between F3 and F2 and between F1 and F0 are calculated.
Third, these differences are classified into one of two categories depending upon whether
or not their difference exceeds a critical distance of 3 Bark. Syrdal and Gopal show that
this twofold binary classification is related to the vowel's phonetic features. The relation
is given by the following map:
< 3 Bark
> 3 Bark
F3-F2
front
back
F1-F0
high
mid, low
Since this classificatory schema only distinguishes four possible categories, it is not by
itself sufficient to uniquely identify the ten different American vowels being considered.
Additional information is required to identify the vowels. Syrdal and Gopal have
analyzed critical bark differences in several other dimensions (F2-F1, F4-F2 and F4-F3)
and determined that these measures could be used reliably to further discriminate between
all but three pairs of vowels (/Ε/ and /æ/, /u/ and /Υ/, /a/ and / /). Other kinds of
information (like vowel duration) can also be used to discriminate vowels.
11

Perceived pitch does not vary linearly with actual frequency of pure tones. The Bark
scale is one of a number of non-linear scales. The significance of the Bark scale is
discussed in the final section of this paper.
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Although Syrdal and Gopal think there is good evidence that the human auditory
system uses binary feature classifications to minimize inter- and intraspeaker variability
with respect to the production of vowels, they do not commit themselves to one particular
computational model for vowel recognition. Instead they categorize vowels using a
number of different features including critical bark differences, absolute bark values and
vowel duration. They do not try to argue which of these techniques (if any) the human
auditory system uses for feature discrimination. For this reason I have left some of the
inputs in the vowel identification mechanism in figure 3 unspecified. These details turn
out not to be significant for the kinds of tests described in the next section. What is
critical is the general approach to normalization and identification. Syrdal and Gopal
believe that these discriminations can be made based upon the structure of the signal
being identified, regardless of what particular acoustic features are actually used to make
binary discriminations. This is the sense in which the Syrdal/Gopal model is selfnormalizing.
The Gerstman and Syrdal/Gopal models illustrate several noteworthy features of
mechanisms and mechanical models. The most important characteristic of mechanisms is
that they are complex structures consisting of a number of parts. Thus, a mechanical
model must specify the hypothesized parts of the mechanism. The parts of the Gerstman
and Syrdal/Gopal mechanisms are given respectively in the boxes found in figures 2 and
3. These diagrams do not simply specify a list of parts, but also their functional
arrangement. In particular, the arrows represent the causal interactions that occur
between the different parts. The flow chart representation I have used to summarize these
mechanisms is certainly not the only possible way to present a mechanical model, but it is
an especially natural one.
If one compares the diagrams in figures 2 and 3 with visual representations of
more paradigmatic mechanisms, like schematics for electronic or mechanical devices,
what is striking is that there is no indication of the size, location or arrangement of the
parts. Parts are instead specified functionally, that is, in terms of the causal role of the
part within the overall mechanism. Note that the parts are themselves complex
mechanisms. Their behavior is described but the mechanism underlying the behavior left
unspecified. This strategy has an important advantage. By leaving out the details by
which these functions are implemented, the model highlights the explanatorily relevant
features of the mechanism. The correctness of these explanations will not turn on how it
is, for instance, that the formant frequency analyzer works, so long as there exists some
mechanism that performs this function.
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III.

Evaluating Mechanical Models

The Gerstman and Syrdal/Gopal models represent competing models of the
mechanism responsible vowel normalization. It is tempting to ask which (if either) of
these models has gotten the mechanism right, but that question is naïve. The reason for
this is not just that decisive evidence is hard to come by, but rather that the posited
relationship between a model and the mechanism it models is one of similarity rather than
isomorphic correspondence. This similarity comes in varying degrees and respects; and
while some authors (e.g., Hughes, 1997) argue that the concept of similarity is a vague
and misleading, in the context of particular models, similarity claims can be spelled out in
ways that make it unproblematic.
What distinguishes mechanical models from models generally is that they must
articulate a set of components whose activities and interactions produce the phenomenon
in question. For models of this sort, there are a number of questions one can ask about
respects of similarity. We may divide these respects into two classes. The first class
concerns of the adequacy of the behavioral description, or simply behavioral adequacy:
1. Does the model predict (quantitatively or qualitatively) the overall behavior of the
mechanism? Do these predictions hold for all inputs, or only for some ranges?
The second class concerns adequacy of the mechanical description, or mechanical
adequacy:
2. Has the model identified all of the components in the mechanism? Have the
components been localized?
3. For each component, has the model correctly identified its causally relevant
properties – i.e., the properties whose changes figure into interactions with other
components?
4. Does the model provide quantitatively accurate descriptions of the interactions
and activities of each component?
5. Does the model correctly represent the spatial and temporal organization of the
mechanism?
6. If the model includes submodels of the mechanical structure of components, are
these submodels good representations of these components?
7. Is the mechanism identified by the model the sole mechanism responsible for the
production of the behavior, or are there multiple mechanisms? If there are
multiple mechanisms, do they operate concurrently and redundantly, or do
different mechanisms operate in different contexts?
The distinction between behavioral and mechanical adequacy has been recognized by
other authors. Lloyd makes a similar distinction, where she observes that a model can
adequately predict outcomes, but be merely understood as “calculating devices… because
their isomorphism with the natural system is so limited” (1994, p. 148). Similarly, as I
have argued elsewhere (2002b) much of the debate over the adequacy of genic selection
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models and “beanbag genetics” can be seen as a debate about whether behaviorally
adequate genic selection models correctly represent causal mechanisms.
Let us now consider the adequacy of the behavioral descriptions given by the
Gerstman and Syrdal/Gopal models. These models were constructed after the fact, as sets
of algorithms for correctly classifying those vowels in the Peterson and Barney dataset
that were unanimously classified by a panel human listeners. As such, both models are
“observationally equivalent” to this panel of human listeners, and so it is plausible to say
that the models meet the criterion of behavioral adequacy. On the other hand, it is
important to remember that this equivalence has only been tested for a very small range of
possible inputs. A more adequate model of the mechanism would approximate the
behavior of human listeners for vowels spoken by a wider variety of speakers in a wider
variety of phonetic, prosodic, syntactic and semantic contexts. The difficulty of such a
demand is that to emulate human speakers in such contexts would require the
construction of models of large parts of the complex mechanisms of speech perception.
Human listeners use higher-level information to help in speech perception tasks (See,
e.g., Warren, 1970 on the phoneme restoration effect). Unless these models of vowel
recognition are embedded in larger models of speech recognition, it will not be possible
to fully judge the behavioral adequacy of these models.
But let us set aside the limitations on the behavioral adequacy of these models,
and turn to their mechanical adequacy. To the extent that both of these models “save the
phenomena” (i.e., are behaviorally adequate), they illustrate how the relationship between
behavioral and mechanical adequacy parallels the well-known problem of
underdetermination.
The classic formulation of the underdetermination problem presupposes a
distinction between observation and theory statements. The problem then is that any of
an infinite number of theories (i.e., sets of theoretical statements together with bridge
principles) may entail a given set of observation statements.
Critics of the
underdetermination thesis (e.g., Laudan, 1990) argue that while there is an “in principle”
logical sense in which observation will always underdetermine theory, the practical
import of the result is overblown.
While I agree with such assessments of the logical problem, a more interesting
version of the problem surfaces in assessing mechanical models. In this case, the
problem is that multiple mechanical descriptions (analogous to theories) may entail
similar or identical behavioral descriptions (analogous to observations). In the case of the
two models discussed here, the mechanical descriptions are not ad hoc constructions, but
represent plausible competing hypotheses about the mechanisms responsible for
observable behaviors.
In its mechanistic version, the underdetermination problem is not a logical
conundrum but a methodological challenge. If two models have equivalent behavioral
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descriptions, how does one decide between them? There are two sorts of approaches.
The first approach, which I call direct inference, is to try to take the mechanism apart and
study the behavior of its parts.
The functional localization strategies explored by Bechtel and Richardson (1993)
and the strategies discussed by Craver and Darden (2001) for discovering neurobiological
mechanisms are principally strategies of this kind. Direct inference strategies defeat the
underdetermination problem by breaking the boundary between theory and observation.
While the internal workings of mechanisms may not be readily apparent, they may be
accessible via special observational and experimental methods.
Direct inference strategies are important, and indeed a good deal of work on
mechanisms of speech perception relies upon them. However, there are sometimes
circumstances in which it is impractical or impossible to dissect a mechanism. In the case
of high level cognitive mechanisms, the parts themselves may be complex and highly
distributed and may defy our strategies for localization. Moreover, in the particular case
of speech research where we have no model organisms other than human beings, ethical
considerations place considerable constraints on the kind of physical dissection of
mechanisms that we might otherwise undertake. Thus in cases such as this one must
utilize testing techniques that allow one to make inferences about the internal structure of
a mechanism simply by examining the mechanism’s external behavior. These techniques,
which I call indirect inference methods, examine the behavior of the mechanism under
non-standard conditions. They defeat the standard underdetermination problem by
expanding the range of behavioral information (i.e., by increasing the range of
phenomena the models must “save”). Placing a mechanism in non-standard conditions
will will often cause it to behave in unusual ways—that is, it may break the mechanism.
Observing when and how a mechanism breaks can tell one a lot about how a mechanism
works. One tests the models by seeing if they break in ways similar to the actual
mechanism.
I shall now discuss some of the experimental evidence that can be used to evaluate
these models, focusing on three contrasting features of the models and showing how
techniques of direct or indirect inference can be used to evaluate them. 12 The first of
these features concerns the temporal organization of the mechanism, and in particular the
time at which information required to normalize the vowel space is acquired. Recall that
the basic purpose of these mechanisms is to normalize the vowel space in order to
compensate for variations among talkers. In the initial description of the Gerstman model
we observed that the model uses a “contextual tuning” mechanism, whereby the listener
acquires information about the highest and lowest F1 and F2 values for a particular

12

I discuss a broader array of features in more technical detail in Glennan 1992.
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speaker’s vowels, and uses this information to adjust to that speaker. How this calibration
mechanism works is left unspecified, but presumably it works by using higher level
information (e.g., involving expectations about what people say) to make guesses as to
what vowels are being used. Thus, in order for a signal representing a vowel token to be
correctly identified, the mechanism must already have been calibrated by an earlier signal.
In contrast, the Syrdal and Gopal model supposes that the signal representing the vowel
token is self-normalizing, in the sense that adjustments to inter-speaker variations in F1
and F2 can be made using other features of the signal itself.
Nusbaum and Morin (1992) devised an experiment to test whether human vowel
recognition depends upon a contextual turning or a non-contextual self-normalizing
mechanism. This experiment is an exemplar of an indirect inference technique. Under
normal conditions, listeners have access to both the contextual information that would
tune a Gerstman-type mechanism and the structural features of the speech signal that
would tune a Syrdal/Gopal-type mechanism. Their idea was to construct a non-standard
condition in which contextual information was removed, and to see if this would “break”
the mechanism. If this occurred, it would be evidence against the contextual tuning
model.
To do this Nusbaum and Morin provided listeners with sequences of syllables and
asked them to identify which of these syllables contained a target vowel. Subjects were
given two kinds of sequences. In the first type of sequence, all syllables came from the
same talker, while in the second, syllables came from different talkers. The second
condition then eliminated contextual cues that could be used to calibrate the mechanism.
Nusbaum and Morin’s experiments had mixed results. On the one hand, they
found no significant difference in listener’s performance in the two conditions. This fact
suggests that listeners do not need the context to tune their vowel normalization
mechanism. On the other hand, they found that listeners were considerably faster in
making identifications in the same-talker condition. These results lead Nusbaum and
Morin to hypothesize that human listeners have redundant normalization mechanisms,
with the more computationally efficient contextual tuning mechanism being used unless
contextual clues were eliminated.
The second feature with respect to which we can compare these models concerns
the features of the speech signal that are used to identify vowels. The Gerstman model
uses only the first and second formants, while the Syrdal and Gopal model uses additional
information – notably the fundamental frequency (F0) and third formant (F3). Nusbaum
and Morin (1992) again devised an experiment that used indirect inference to determine
how the models compared to actual auditory mechanisms in this respect. While the
standard data set that was used to assess the adequacy of these models’ behavioral
descriptions contained the full range of acoustical information associated with speech
signals, Nusbaum and Morin constructed modified signals in which F0 and F3 were
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removed. Listeners were presented with the modified set of stimuli and were again asked
to identify which syllables were instances of target vowels. Once again, they were
presented with sequences of syllables in either a same-talker or mixed-talker condition.
The results of these experiments were consistent with Nusbaum and Morin’s hypothesis
of redundant mechanisms. In same-talker condition, where contextual cues were
available, the absence of F0 and F3 information did not impair speakers’ ability to
recognize target vowels. In the mixed-talker condition, where both the contextual cues
and the F0 and F3 information were absent, there was significant degradation in the
ability of listeners to identify target vowels. In this condition, neither of the redundant
mechanisms would have the parameters required to operate correctly.
The third and final feature which I shall discuss concerns the hypothesized
mechanism of frequency analysis. Both models suppose there is an initial component of
the mechanism that analyzes the acoustic signal into pitch and formant frequencies, but
they differ in the output of these components. The Gerstman model proposes that these
frequencies reflect the actual acoustic properties of the signal while the Syrdal/Gopal
model supposes that perceived frequencies are not linear with respect to acoustic
frequencies. Accordingly, the two models describe the output of this component using
different scales – a kilohertz scale for Gerstman and a perceptual scale called the Bark
scale for Syrdal and Gopal.
At issue here is not the accuracy of vowel classification made by the two models,
but the accuracy of the description of the behavior of one of the mechanism’s parts. This
part of the mechanism can be studied more directly than other hypothesized components.
First, it is possible to study pitch perception apart from phoneme recognition by
performing experiments in which subjects are asked to discriminate pure pitches.
Second, there is physiological evidence that the task of frequency analysis is carried out
within the ear. Current evidence suggests that (1) all sound intensity within a certain
critical band of acoustic frequencies is integrated and perceived as a single pitch; (2) the
width of this critical band is not constant over the perceptual range of the auditory
mechanism. (Scharf, 1970); and (3) critical band corresponds to a fixed length along the
basilar membrane (Syrdal and Gopal, 1986).
There is thus substantial evidence that any vowel normalization mechanism would
operate on perceived rather than acoustic frequencies of pitch and formants. While in this
respect the Syrdal/Gopal model is superior, it is interesting that the fact that the Gerstman
model uses acoustic frequencies does not impair the model’s accuracy. Indeed, it is
important to recall in this connection that, because his original purpose was to develop a
technique for machine recognition, Gerstman did not need to utilize the same frequency
analysis mechanism that is used in the human auditory system.
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This is only a partial review of the evidence in favor of the two models, but it is
enough to draw two conclusions about the testing of models generally. First, it shows
that methods of indirect inference make it is possible to study the properties of
mechanisms whose parts are, for whatever reason, difficult to examine and manipulate
directly. Second, it shows that there is not typically a Baconian crucial experiment to
decide between rival models. Models can’t be falsified because models are not true or
false, but are rather similar to the systems they model in degrees and respects of the sort
listed at the beginning of this section. This fact also explains why it is not possible to
cleanly separate discovery and testing, (cf. Darden, 1991, Craver and Darden, 2001).
Models aren’t generally thrown out after failures in crucial experiments, but are rather
elaborated to gradually increase their degrees and respects of similarity.
It is difficult to specify a principled way in which the degrees and respects of
similarity and dissimilarity should be weighed against each other, and hence it may be
difficult to say which of two models is the more similar to the modeled system. But this
is hardly a defect in the analysis of models presented here. Indeed, it goes some way
towards explaining why scientists may continue to test and articulate a number of
different and incompatible models.
It might be argued that my choice of models has lead to an overstatement of my
case. The models discussed in this paper are representations of a small part of an
extremely complicated speech recognition mechanism, and there are reasons to believe
that a fuller understanding of speech recognition will show that the relationship between
vowel recognition and other parts of speech processing are more complicated than current
models suggest. We have also seen evidence that the mechanism responsible for this
aspect of speech recognition appears to be redundant, so that each model tells only part of
the story. Moreover, except in the case of the mechanism of frequency analysis, there is
very little direct evidence about where or how the hypothesized components operate.
Collectively, these facts might suggest that the models in question are unusually partial
and sketchy, an investigation of more developed models would not support my
conclusions regarding the nature of models as representations.
There will certainly be models in which the range of behavior is more completely
specified, the parts and their properties more clearly identified, and the like. In such
cases, it may be reasonable to judge a model of a mechanism correct or incorrect. If, for
instance, one has a circuit diagram for a radio, it would seem possible to judge it as either
correct or incorrect. But even a correct circuit diagram will not be similar to the radio in
all respects. It will not, for instance, represent the physical size of components or the
physical geometry of their layout on the circuit board. Models, as Giere (1999) tells us,
are like maps, and maps always represent only selected features of the terrain. Equally
important, my hunch (and it is admittedly only a hunch) is that the sorts of models one
constructs to describe complex natural phenomena will more often be of the partial kind I
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have described than of the sort represented by a circuit diagram. At any rate, we should
recognize that there is no firm line between complete and partial models (or between
mechanism schemata and mechanism sketches), but that models undergo continuous
processes of articulation and refinement.
Not all models studied by scientists are mechanical models, but many are. While
there will always be domain specific strategies of model formulation and testing,
recognizing the pervasiveness of mechanisms and their models will increase
understanding of similarities in strategies across domains.
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